The impact of the electricity tariff reform on renewable energies and energy efficiency investments: The case of the Italian residential market by Chiaroni, Davide et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ljge20
Download by: [Vito Manfredi Latilla] Date: 26 July 2017, At: 12:21
International Journal of Green Energy
ISSN: 1543-5075 (Print) 1543-5083 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ljge20
The impact of the electricity tariff reform on
renewable energies and energy efficiency
investments: The case of the Italian residential
market
Davide Chiaroni, Vittorio Chiesa, Simone Franzò, Federico Frattini & Vito
Manfredi Latilla
To cite this article: Davide Chiaroni, Vittorio Chiesa, Simone Franzò, Federico Frattini & Vito
Manfredi Latilla (2017): The impact of the electricity tariff reform on renewable energies and energy
efficiency investments: The case of the Italian residential market, International Journal of Green
Energy, DOI: 10.1080/15435075.2017.1336715
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15435075.2017.1336715
Accepted author version posted online: 08
Jun 2017.
Published online: 08 Jun 2017.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 24
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
The impact of the electricity tariff reform on renewable energies and energy
efficiency investments: The case of the Italian residential market
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ABSTRACT
This article investigates the impact that the electricity tariff reform is likely to have on investments in
renewable energies (i.e., photovoltaics) and the adoption of energy efficiency measures (i.e., installation
of heat pumps and efficient home appliances) in the residential market in Italy. The study develops
detailed cost comparisons and simulations considering two different investment scenarios (before and
after the reform) to conclude that the reform will: (i) have a negative impact on investments in









The electricity sector is going through a transformation
driven by technological changes and, most importantly,
national and supranational policies aimed at tackling three
major challenges, i.e., environmental sustainability, energy
supply security, and sustainable economic development
(European Commission 2007). Technological advancements
have led to significant cost and performance improvements
for some renewable energy sources (RES), such as onshore
wind and photovoltaics (PV) (Hirth 2013). The combination
of technological advances, innovative financing, deal struc-
turing, and business model configurations, have led to the
increasing cost competitiveness of RES (Stark et al. 2015).
Furthermore, recent policies foresee more stringent targets
in terms of CO2 emission, increased penetration of RES, and
higher levels of energy efficiency (Manzano-Agugliaro et al.
2013), thereby bestowing a strategic role to electricity and
heat generation from RES and to the adoption of energy
efficiency measures (EEM) (Pantaleo, Camporeale, and
Shah 2013; Viola et al. 2014).
At the European level, the European Commission’s strat-
egy to deal with climate change (European Commission 2015)
focuses on the need to reduce emissions by 40% and increase
the electricity produced from RES to 27% by 2030 (COM
(2012) 663 final (2012); COM (2012) 271 (2012); European
Directive 28 2009). RES generated electricity accounts for
27.5% of EU-28 gross electricity consumption (Eurostat
2016). In terms of total investments in new RES plants in
Europe, wind power accounts for 38%, photovoltaics for
around 36%, and hydroelectric power plants for around 14%
(Figure 1) (Energy&Strategy 2016a).
The high penetration of RES in the electricity generation
mix significantly affects the price dynamics and network
congestion, and as a result, the performance of the electricity
market (Cucchiella, D’Adamo, and Gastaldi 2012). This is
particularly relevant in the Italian market, one of the most
developed in Europe in terms of renewable energy penetra-
tion, and plays a major role in terms of EEM investments
(ACEEE 2016; ENEA 2015). In Italy, new investments in PV
systems in 2015 totalled €558 million, equal to 290 MW of
new installed capacity. Investments in the residential market
segment (including systems with a power rate of up to 20 kW)
accounted for 51% of total investments, equal to 55% of total
new power installed capacity (Figure 2) (Energy&Strategy
2016a). Overall, 23,788 MW of RES plants were installed in
Italy between 2010–2015 (Table 1). In the first quarter of
2016, new installed PV systems amounted to 195 MW, up
46% compared with the same period in 2015. Nevertheless, in
the first quarter of 2016, the aggregate value of new PV, wind
and hydroelectric installations was 19% less than the installed
capacity in the same quarter in 2015 (ANIE 2016). Moreover,
in the first 9 months of 2016, the RES energy produced
covered 30.8% of total energy demand in Italy, down 3.8%
compared with the same period in 2015 and 4.2% compared
to the same period in 2014 (Gestore Servizi Energetici 2016;
TERNA 2016).
Energy efficiency in conjunction with RES constitutes
another pillar of the European strategy to reduce carbon
emissions, since EEM can contribute significantly to the
reduction of energy consumption (Blok et al. 2015; Chiaroni
et al. 2016b; Gestlberger et al. 2016; Ponsa et al. 2013). In
recent years, energy efficiency has become part of national
and international policy discussions and is recognized as a
relevant factor of sustainable environmental and economic
growth (Geller et al. 2006; Karimu and Brännlund 2015).
Specifically, implementing EEM is of paramount importance
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at the EU level where electricity prices tend to be higher
compared to other geographic areas (Astrov et al. 2015).
Hence, the EU has established a set of binding measures to
help EU countries reach the 20% energy efficiency target by
2020, requiring member states to use energy more efficiently
at all stages of the energy chain, from production to final
consumption (European Directive 27 2012). In the last
4 years, EEM investments showed a Compound Annual
Growth Rate (CAGR) of over 10% at the European level
(Energy&Strategy 2015b). In this regard, Italy has adopted a
national energy strategy that prioritizes energy efficiency as
the cornerstone of energy supply security, reducing energy
costs for citizens and businesses, and ensuring environmental
protection through greenhouse gas reductions (Ministero
Dello Sviluppo Economico 2013). Thanks to proactive legisla-
tion, Italy is ranked second worldwide among the most
energy-efficient countries (ACEEE 2016), and investments in
EEM continue to increase, up to over €7.9 billion in 2015
(Energy&Strategy 2015b). The residential sector in 2015 was
responsible for the majority of total EEM investments, fol-
lowed by the industrial sector (ENEA 2016). Specifically,
energy-efficient home appliances (with a market value of
more than 2 billion €) constituted the most adopted EEM in
the residential sector in 2015, followed by heat pumps, which
accounted for more than 1 billion € (Figure 3)
(Energy&Strategy 2016b).
In this scenario, the electricity tariff reform for the resi-
dential market in Italy (hereinafter, “reform”) entered into
force on 1 January 2016 following Deliberation 582/2015/R/
EEL of the Italian Regulatory Authority for Electricity, Gas
and Water (AEEGSI) (AEEGSI, 2015a), in line with the
national implementation of the EU Energy Efficiency
Directive (European Directive 27 2012). The goal of the
reform is to increase the electrification of residential energy
consumption to fully exploit the use of electricity generated
from RES, moving beyond the progressive structure of the
network services and system charges tariffs introduced after
the oil price shock of 1973 to discourage high electricity
consumption among residential customers.
The reform is expected to have an impact on RES and
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Figure 2. Cumulative RES installed capacity in Italy over the period 2008–2015 (Energy&Strategy 2016a).
Table 1. New RES installation in Italy in MW and € divided by production source for 2010–2015 (Energy&Strategy 2016a)
RES 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Cumulative 2010–2015
Wind MW 1,100 900 1,350 400 107 420 4,277
Mln € 1,850 1,800 2,000 700 151 670 7,171
PV MW 2,323 9,370 3,328 1,736 385 290 17,432
Mln € 7,600 20,135 6,215 2,508 658 558 37,516
Hydroelectric power MW 155 216 140 69 73 110 763
Mln € 621 850 580 309 327 510 3,197
Bioenergies MW 140 362 574 90 80 70 1,316
Mln € 517 1,295 2,070 388 347 308 4,925
Total MW 3,718 10,848 5,392 2,295 645 890 23,788
Mln € 10,588 24,080 10,865 3,905 1,483 2,046 52,967
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tariff structure of electricity bills will affect the profitability
of such investments. Electricity generation is a sector, where
investments are determined by several factors, such as public
policies, country generation mix, wholesale energy prices,
availability of resources, administrative procedures, and
social acceptance of new technology systems (Bechberger
and Reiche 2004). Furthermore, economic policies (such as
investment subsidies) and regulatory policies (such as the
enforcement of new tariffs) play a key role in defining the
electricity market regulatory framework, affecting the
amount of money that will flow to new RES projects and
develop further EEM (Mignon and Bergek 2016). This is
particularly relevant in the electricity generation sector
where the still-comparatively higher cost of electricity pro-
duced from RES, its dispatchability and impact on the grid
structure have made it virtually impossible for RES to grow
without the support of regulatory intervention (Das,
Bhattacharya, and Cañizares 2014; Longo et al. 2014;
Menanteau, Dominique, and Lamy 2003; Painuly 2001).
Aims and Structure of the Article
Although the role of regulatory policies in the electricity
market has been widely investigated with a particular focus
on their effects on the diffusion of distributed generation and
the deployment of new RES investments (Badcock and Lenzen
2010; Battle, Pérez-Arriaga, and Zambrano-Barragán 2012;
Cossent, Gómez, and Frías 2009; Del Río and Linares 2014;
Jäger-Waldau et al. 2011; Kalkuhl, Edenhofer, and Lessmanna
2013), the relationship between changes in electricity tariffs
and investments in RES and EEM is still under-researched in
academic literature.
This article attempts to analyze how changes in the
electricity tariff for the residential market in Italy may
directly affect the rate of new investments in RES and
EEM. In recent years, several European countries besides
Italy (i.e., Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Germany) have
reformed their electricity tariff systems to adjust the fixed
part of the tariff components to meet the corresponding
costs borne by energy companies, since such costs are
increasing due to the high penetration of RES in the energy
mix (European Commission 2014). In particular, Spain,
Portugal, and Greece have invested massively in PV systems
in the last decade, while Germany has invested in both PV
systems and wind farms. The analysis, research, and prac-
tical implications presented in this article are therefore
particularly timely. For researchers, this is a first attempt
to fill a gap in academic literature on the analysis of the
extent to which electricity tariff reforms affect RES and
EEM investments. For practitioners and policy makers,
this study offers some useful insights to help align rate-
making practices with the growing demand for energy pro-
duction from RES and EEM at the residential level.
To achieve the objectives, the article develops and com-
ments on detailed cost comparisons and simulations by con-
sidering two different RES and EEM investment scenarios
(i.e., before and after the reform in Italy) and modelling
different consumption patterns.
Regarding RES, the paper focuses on PV systems, since
these have received the largest share of investments in recent
years (Figure 2), and the Italian market is now characterized
by the absence of incentives and other supporting mechan-
isms for photovoltaic installations. Therefore, changes in the
market dynamics, as introduced by the reform, may negatively
affect the profitability of the PV industry (Chiaroni et al.
2014). Regarding EEM, the article focuses on heat pumps
and efficient home appliances, since these technologies are
attracting a large part of EEM investments at the residential
level (Figure 3) (Energy&Strategy 2016b).
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates the
most relevant characteristics of the reform; Section 3 describes
the empirical approach and the data analysis, and paves the
way for the discussion on the impact of the reform on RES
and EEM investments presented in Section 4. Lastly, Section 5
offers the main conclusions of the study.
The electricity tariff reform for the residential market
in Italy
The reform affects two of the four electricity bill cost compo-
nents: the network services tariff and system charges tariff.
The other two cost components are unaffected by the reform,
i.e., selling service (the cost of electricity delivered to the
customer) and taxes on the electric bill (including 10% VAT
and other minor fiscal duties, such as excise tax).
Network services represent the tariff for metering, mar-
keting, and distributing electricity, and mainly reflect the
cost incurred to cover network transport and the system
service. As the RES penetration level increases, this cost
becomes relevant, since the effect of non-dispatchable energy
sources on network operations is bound to increase. The
system charges tariff reflects the costs of covering general
services to maintain and operate the electricity system. In
2015, the most relevant components of the system charges
tariff were: (i) RES incentives equal to 82.02% of the total
system charges tariff; (ii) fiscal burden of financing the
decommissioning of Italian nuclear plants equal to 7.03%
of the total system charges tariff; (iii) actions to promote
the adoption of energy efficiency measures equal to 4.13% of
the total system charges tariff.
According to the tariff system in place before the reform
entered into force, 99% of the electricity price related to














Figure 3. Investment breakdown in EEM for the residential sector in Italy in 2015
(million €) (Energy&Strategy 2016b).
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network and the system charges tariffs, i.e., with a kWh unit
cost that increased for bands with greater off-take and thus
discouraging higher levels of electricity consumption. The
pre-reform system had four consumption bands: (i) below
1,800 kWh/year; (ii) between 1,800 and 2,640 kWh/year; (iii)
between 2,640 and 4,400 kWh/year; (iv) over 4,440 kWh/year.
Two different tariffs applied to each of these bands: (i) tariff
“D2” for resident customers with a rated power of 3 kW; (ii)
tariff “D3” for either non-resident customers or for resident
customers with a rated power above 3 kWh1 (Figure 4). In
2015, the network services and system charges tariffs
accounted respectively for 17.39% and 25.28% of the total
average electricity price (Figure 5).
The reform introduces two major changes:
● Regarding the network services tariff, the previous vari-
able and progressive structure of the tariff with a kWh
unit cost that increased for bands with greater off-take
(€/kWh) has been replaced by a non-progressive tariff
structure as detailed below:
(1) Fixed amount (€/year) for metering and marketing
costs
(2) Power amount (€/kW/year) for the distribution cost,
which becomes a fixed amount, although it depends
on the installed rate-power
(3) Energy amount (c€/kWh) for transmission costs,
which is now the only variable cost.
● Regarding the system charges tariff, the reform has
completely replaced the progressive structure. 75% of
the electricity bill now depends on the kWh used, with
a tariff expressed in c€/kWh. The remaining 25% is a
fixed component related to the distribution cost. A
differentiation is still made between resident customers
(to whom an energy amount is applied, i.e., in c€ per
kWh used) and non-resident customers (to whom the
tariff is applied in both the fixed amount and energy
amount).
The gradual replacement of the progressive structure of the
network services and system charges tariffs will be implemen-
ted in three phases over a 3 year period (1 January 2016; 1
January 2017; 1 January 2018). This will generate a more
linear relationship between electricity consumption (kWh)
and price paid by costumers (€) (Figure 6) (Energy&Strategy
2016a).
Since 1 January 2016, network service tariffs are subject to
a first intervention aimed at “mitigating” the progressive
effect of consumption (c€/kWh) and increasing the fixed
quotas. Table 2 reports the Δ price of kWh (referring to
the two cost components affected by the reform, i.e., the
network services and system charges tariffs) segmented by
consumption bands. To be noted is that, following the
reform, the higher the kWh consumption, the higher the
saving compared to the previous scenario.
From 1 January 2017, with the full application of the non-
progressive tariff for network services for resident customers,
only two consumption bands remain. Finally, from 1 January
2018, the reform will be fully in force, applying the non-
progressive structure also to the general system cost tariff.
Methodology
This section illustrates the methodological approach fol-
lowed to evaluate the effects of the reform on new RES and
EEM investments. First, the effects on the electricity bill of
both resident and non-resident customers are estimated,
Figure 4. Electricity tariff breakdown (variable part) before the reform for a resident and non-resident customer (Energy&Strategy 2016a).
1For clarity, according to Italian legislation, the residential electricity market is constituted of resident and non-resident customers. The former reside
permanently in the apartment/house, the latter use the apartment/house typically for weekends, vacations, and/or short-term periods (generally, second
homes), and different tariffs apply, as will be explained in the remainder of the article.
4 D. CHIARONI ET AL.
focusing on three different consumption bands, i.e., custo-
mers with a yearly consumption of 1,800 kWh, 2,700 kWh,
and 4,000 kWh. These represent the annual consumption of
three different customer clusters in Italy (respectively, a
single person, a couple with two children, and a larger
family) and are the same bands that AEEGSI uses in its
simulations to test the impact of new policies on end custo-
mers (AEEGSI 2015b, 2015c).
Regarding the analysis of the effects of the reform on
the economic viability of RES and EEM investments,
simulations were run on the same consumption bands.
The financial indicators adopted to analyze the economic
viability of RES and EEM investments are Net Present
Value (NPV), Pay-Back Time (PBT), and Internal Rate
of Return (IRR).
The NPV uses the discounted differential cash flows gen-
erated by the investment during its operation (set at 20 years
in the present analysis), applying a discount rate that mea-
sures the risk level of the investment (Tudisca et al. 2013). In
other words, the NPV compares the present values of the
forecasted net cash inflow with the initial capex investment
to determine the profitability of the investment or project
(Samba Sowe, Thanarak, and Suriwong 2014).







T = project duration in years
i = discount rate, set at 4% in this analysis
CF (Cash Flow) = expected net benefit at the end of each
year.
The Pay-Back Time (PBT) of an investment is a measure of
the time required to reach the point at which the sum of the
differential cash inflows (discounted or non-discounted) is
equal to the sum of the differential cash outflows (again,
discounted or non-discounted). Both cash inflows and out-








2,000 KWh 4,000 KWh 6,000 KWh 8,000 KWh
D2 before Reform D3 before Reform
D2 after Reform D3 after Reform
Figure 6. Yearly changes in electricity bills before and after the reform for a resident (D2) and non-resident (D3) customer (Energy&Strategy 2016a).
Table 2. Δ price of kWh (referring only to the network services and system










0–1,880 0.00539 0.00517 −0.00022
1,801–2,640 0.04236 0.03067 −0.01169
2,641–4,400 0.08218 0.06709 −0.01509
> 4,400 0.12485 0.06709 −0.05776
Figure 5. Electricity tariff breakdown in 2015 (Energy&Strategy 2016a).
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calculation. Differently from the NPV, the PBT is more sub-
jective in its application, as the decision-maker must define a
maximum acceptable time (cut-off time) to define the eco-
nomic feasibility of an investment. In the Italian residential
sector, a typical acceptable payback threshold is approxi-
mately 6 years (Energy&Strategy 2015a).
The PBT is calculated as follows:
Xt¼1
PBT
CF tð Þ= 1þ ið Þ^t ¼ 0
where:
PBT = Pay-Back Time
i = discount rate
CF (Cash Flow) = expected net benefit at the end of each
year (i.e., differential cash inflows minus the differential
cash outflows).
Finally, the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is a measure of
the average profitability of an investment (i.e., the discount
rate that adjusts future cash flows so that they are equal to the
investment outlay). Both cash inflows and outflows are the
same as those for the NPV calculation. The IRR is a relative
indicator, therefore a subjective threshold has to be defined
for the investment’s economic evaluation (Tudisca et al.
2013), such as the cost of capital.




1þ IRRð Þt ¼ 0
Tables 3 and 4 show the assumptions at the base of the
different simulations to evaluate the impact of the reform
on RES investments, i.e., a rooftop PV system. Each custo-
mer referred to in Table 3 adopts a 3 kW rooftop PV
system, with the characteristics detailed in Table 4, and
shows a 30% natural self-consumption rate (Chiaroni
et al. 2014). Two residential customer types are analyzed
(resident and non-resident) and the profitability of invest-
ments is estimated in a pre-reform and post-reform sce-
nario, i.e., with the new tariff scheme.
To empirically test the impact of the reform on the adop-
tion of EEM, a first simulation is run on a customer who
intends to replace old home appliances (i.e., a fridge, washing
machine and dishwasher) in energy efficiency class A with
new and more efficient appliances in energy efficiency class A
++, as summarized in Table 8.
Second, a simulation is run on the replacement of a low-
efficient heat pump with a new more efficient one. Table 10
shows the technical specifications of the two heat pumps (old/
new), together with the savings obtained by both a resident
and non-resident customer through the adoption of a new
heat pump, before and after the reform. Since the adoption of
a heat pump determines a significant increase in electricity
consumption, in this simulation, the electricity prices consid-
ered (c€/kWh) are those applied to the highest consumption
band (i.e., 4,000 kWh/year) as referred to in Table 3 for
customer #3.
The technical and economic data on RES and EEM were
collected through a review of product data sheets, corrobo-
rated by direct interviews with a sample of manufacturers
operating in the Italian market.
The impact of the reform on the profitability of RES
and EEM investments
The analysis of the effects of the reform on electricity bills
shows that customers with a lower annual consumption are
penalized by the reform, while customers with a higher annual
consumption benefit from the reform. In particular, a resident
customer using 1,800 kWh/year incurs a cost of 108 €/year
more than before, which represents a 36% increase in the
electricity bill. A resident customer using 4,000 kWh/year
saves 164€, which represents a 19.5% decrease in the electri-
city bill. Lastly, the reform does not have a relevant impact on
customers using 2,700 kWh/year. Figure 7 shows the results of
the simulations for a resident customer, while Figure 8 shows
the results for a non-resident customer.
Regarding the impact of the reform on RES investments,
Table 5 shows the result of the simulation for both a resident
and a non-resident customer, with a yearly consumption of
1,800 kWh, installing a rooftop PV system with the character-
istics detailed in Table 4. For a resident customer, the increase
in the electricity tariff is counterbalanced by a lower value for
net metering (so-called scambio sul posto), which leads to a
PBT of 16 years, 2 years longer than previously, an IRR above
6%, and a NPV equal to €1,543. Comparing such values with
those before the reform entered into force shows that the
reform penalizes the investment in a rooftop PV system for
a resident customer. For a non-resident customer, the sce-
nario is even worse, since this customer has difficulty in self-
consuming the electricity produced by the PV system due to
the typical use of secondary homes for vacations or weekends.
Table 3. Electricity price for a resident and non-resident customer.









Energy price for the end
costumer before the reform
(c€/kWh)
Energy price for the end
costumer after the reform
(c€/kWh)
Energy price for the end
costumer before the reform
[c€/kWh)
Energy price for the end




1,800 3 16.5 22.5 20 33
Customer
#2
2,700 3 19.3 19.4 23.8 25.5
Customer
#3
4,000 3 21 17 25.2 21
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The increase in the electricity tariff is therefore not set-off by
any real opportunity to self-consume the electricity produced
by the rooftop PV system.
Table 6 shows the results of the simulation for both a
resident and a non-resident customer with a yearly consump-
tion of 2,700 kWh and installing a rooftop PV system. This
scenario is particularly interesting because a yearly consump-
tion of 2,700 kWh represents a real case for a resident family
with two children who paid €521 before the reform and is
expected to pay €523.8 after the reform, thus a negligible
difference (Figure 7). However, the IRR associated with this
investment decreases from 7.9% to 5.8% after the reform.
Such reduction is due to the worsening of net metering,
since the amount reimbursed as a variable cost for services
and network charges is now lower than before the reform.
The IRR and NPV show similar results, bringing to light the
remarkable negative effect that the reform has on an invest-
ment in a rooftop PV system for this type of customer. The
same consideration can be made for a non-resident customer,
with a higher PBT associated with the investment in the post-
reform scenario, as well a deterioration of the other two
financial indicators. The worsening of the financial indicators
for this customer is somewhat mitigated by the higher elec-
tricity price this customer has to pay after the reform, equal to
25.5 c€/kWh compared to 19.4 c€/kWh for a resident custo-
mer (Table 3), making any small amount of self-consumption
a valid opportunity to save on the electricity bill.
Finally, Table 7 shows the results of the simulation for both
a resident and non-resident customer with a yearly consump-
tion of 4,000 kWh. Also emerging in this case is a worsening
of the IRR and other financial indicators mainly due to the
decreasing structure of the electricity tariff, which incentivizes
Table 5. Financial indicators related to the adoption a PV system by a customer
with a yearly consumption of 1,800 kWh.
Before the reform After the reform
Financial indicator Resident Non-resident Resident Non-resident
NPV (€) 2,254 2,530 1,543 1,748
IRR (%) 6.9 8 6.1 6.2
PBT (years) 14 12 16 15
Table 4. Investment characteristics of the rooftop PV system.
Characteristics Value
Installed capacity (kW) 3
CapEx (€/kW) 2,200
Operating hours (h) 1,200
Natural self-consumption rate (%) 30
Administrative costs (€) 250
Tax deduction (%) 50 (of the Capex)
Net metering (‘Scambio sul posto’) Yes
Decrease of PV performance (%/year) 1
Yearly electricity consumption (kWh) 1,800–2,700–4,000
Discount rate (%) 4
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1,800 kWh/year 2,700 kWh/year 4,000 kWh/year
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Figure 8. Comparison between electric bill for a non-resident customer before and after the reform (Energy&Strategy 2016a).
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a higher level of electricity consumption, hence reducing the
economic value of the energy saving generated by the self-
consumption of electricity produced by a PV system.
Furthermore, the non-resident customer sees a less severe
worsening of the financial indicators associated with the
investment in a rooftop PV system.
On the energy efficiency side, the reform provides a deci-
sively better scenario in the case of a customer with low
electricity consumption (i.e., 1,800 kWh/year) willing to
replace less efficient home appliances with new efficient
ones, since the PBT of such investment decreases from over
20 years to around 9 years for a resident customer compared
to the pre-reform scenario, as detailed in Tables 8 and 9. As
for the improvement of the other financial indicators, this is
due to the higher electricity price (+36%) that this customer
will pay compared to before the reform.
The same investment related to the other two customer
types (i.e., with an electricity consumption equal to
2,700 kWh/year and 4,000 kWh/year) shows a marginal
improvement of the financial indicators compared to the
pre-reform scenario. Also in the case of non-resident custo-
mers, the impact of the reform is positive in relation to
replacing less efficient home appliances with new more effi-
cient ones, especially for customers with low electricity con-
sumption (i.e., 1,800 kWh/year).
Table 11 shows the financial indicators associated with the
investment in a new heat pump for a resident and a non-
resident customer, before and after the reform. The PBT is
almost the same in the two scenarios for both customer types,
while the IRR and NPV show better values in the pre-reform
scenario for both. Specifically, the non-resident customer who
enjoyed better financial indicators before the reform con-
tinues to benefit from replacing an old heat pump with a
new one, even though the reform worsens the actual financial
benefit.
Conclusions
The goal of the reform in Italy is not to promote a general
increase in energy consumption, which would be in contrast
with European policies and regulations, but rather to favor the
Table 8. Investment characteristics related to the adoption of new home appliances
(i.e., fridge, washing machine and dishwasher) in energy efficiency Class A++.
Characteristic Value
Capex [€] (purchase of dishwasher, fridge and
washing machine
1,800
Tax deduction (%) 50 (of the Capex) over
ten years
Yearly consumption bands (kWh/year) 1,800 2,700 4,000
Consumption rate of home appliances on overall
yearly consumption (%)
70
Yearly energy saving related to the adoption of new
home appliances (kWh/year)
378 567 840
Yearly energy savings before the reform for a
resident customer (€/year)
62.37 109.43 176.4
Yearly energy savings before the reform for a non-
resident customer (€/year)
75.6 134.9 211.68
Yearly energy savings after the reform for a resident
customer (€/year)
85 110 142.8
Yearly energy savings after the reform for a non-
resident customer (€/year)
124.7 141.7 176.4
Table 9. Financial indicators related to the adoption of new home appliances in
energy efficiency Class A++.
Financial indicator Before the Reform After the Reform
Yearly consumption bands (kWh/
year)
1,800 2,700 4,000 1,800 2,700 4,000
Resident customer NPV (€) −160 505 1,452 160.5 513 977
IRR (%) 2.5 8.1 14.9 5.4 8.2 11.6
PBT
(years)
> 20 8 6 9 7 6
Non-resident
customer
NPV (€) 27.7 867 1,951 721.6 961 1,452
IRR (%) 4.2 10.8 18.2 9.7 11.5 14.9
PBT
(years)
10 7 4 7 6 5
Table 10. Investment characteristics of two different heat pumps.
Characteristic
Old heat
pump New heat pump
Rate Power (kW) 16
Coefficient of Performance 3 4.9
Capex (€) – 7,000
Tax deduction (%) 50 (of the
Capex) over ten
years
Yearly consumption (kWh) 7,467 4,571
Electricity price before the reform for a resident
customer (c€/kWh)
21
Electricity price after the reform for a resident
customer (c€/kWh)
17
Electricity price before the reform for a non-
resident customer (c€/kWh)
25.2
Electricity price after the reform for a non-
resident customer (c€/kWh)
21
Yearly Electric bill before the reform, for a
resident customer (€/year)
1,568 960
Yearly electricity bill after the reform for a
resident customer (€/year)
1,269.4 777
Yearly electricity bill before the reform for a
non-resident customer (€/year)
1,881.68 1,151.9
Yearly electricity bill after the reform for a non-
resident customer (€/year)
1,568 960
Table 11. Financial indicator related to an investment in a new heat pump.
Financial indicator Before the reform After the reform
Resident customer NPV (€) 4,545 2,911
IRR (%) 12.9 9.9
PBT (years) 6 7
Non-resident customer NPV (€) 6,267 4,545.8
IRR (%) 15.93 12.9
PBT (years) 7 8
Table 6. Financial indicators related to the adoption a PV system by a customer
with a yearly consumption of 2,700 kWh.
Before the reform After the reform
Financial indicator Resident Non-resident Resident Non-resident
NPV (€) 3,713 4,580 1,433 3,058
IRR (%) 7.9 11 5.8 7.1
PBT (years) 10 10 16 12
Table 7. Financial indicators related to the adoption a PV system by a customer
with a yearly consumption of 4,000 kWh.
Before the reform After the reform
Financial indicator Resident Non-resident Resident Non-resident
NPV (€) 5,553 6,920 1,652 3,524
IRR (%) 8.6 13 6.2 8.3
PBT (years) 9 8 16 11
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electrification of domestic consumption, incentivizing the
adoption of electric appliances for residential needs. Indeed,
electricity consumption is seen as a substitute for other pri-
mary energy sources that are much less renewable, making a
significant contribution to environmental sustainability.
Moreover, as highlighted in Section 1.1, in recent years, sev-
eral European countries have reformed their electricity tariff
systems to rebalance the domestic tariff scheme taking into
account the huge contribution of distributed energy genera-
tion from RES on the overall energy mix.
Concerning Italy, the simulations show that the reform pena-
lizes customers with low electricity consumption, while favoring
customers with high energy consumption (i.e., 4,000 kWh). For
a customer consuming 1,800 kWh/year, the additional cost
determined by the reform is around €108/year (+36% compared
to the pre-reform electricity bill), while the cost saving for a
customer consuming 4,000 kWh/year is approximately €164
(−19.5% on the pre-reform electricity bill). Lastly, the reform
has almost no impact on customers with an electricity consump-
tion of approximately 2,700 kWh/year.
This gradual replacement of the progressive structure of
network tariffs and general system costs with a non-progres-
sive tariff for network services for all domestic customers
represents a new and somewhat unforeseen scenario for
those willing to invest in a domestic PV system, since the
marginal cost of each kWh decreases with the increase in off-
take, thus discouraging higher levels of self-consumption. The
evidence from the present analysis leads to the conclusion that
the reform will have a negative impact on the PV sector, with
a general reduction in profitability of new investments at the
residential level. In the current market scenario, exogenous
factors such as the economic crisis, the trend toward a reduc-
tion in installed power, and the reduction in incentive tariffs,
already undermine the growth of the PV sector in Italy.
Regarding EEM, it can be concluded that the reform intro-
duces some opportunities for the residential market. On the
one hand, reducing the progressive structure of the network
services tariffs and the general system costs, the reform pro-
motes switching to more efficient electric home appliances (in
Class A++), given that the associated investment provides
interesting financial indicators. On the other hand, for other
EEMs such as electric heat pumps, customers with low-effi-
cient heat pumps will be unwilling to voluntarily replace their
systems with new more efficient ones, since the expected PBT
is now longer than before the reform.
The present study leaves room for further comparative
studies focused on other European countries where policy-
makers are experiencing the same issues discussed here for
Italy. Moreover, it highlights the importance for policymakers
to carefully consider the impact on the diffusion of RES and
EEM when designing electricity tariff reforms, since these
constitute the cornerstone of achieving the targets set by
energy policies at the European level.
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